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NOTES
Rush v. City of Maple Heights-Ramifications
Of Ohio's One Cause of Action Doctrine
SELDOM, IF EVER, has a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court left
the practice of law in Ohio so unsettled as did that court's decision in
Rush v. City of Maple Hetghts.'
The question presented to the court in that case was whether one or
two causes of action arise when one person suffers both personal injury
and property damage as the result of one wrongful act. Other jurisdic-
tions differ with respect to this issue.2
The minority of jurisdictions view a single act resulting in both
personal injury and property damage to one individual as giving rise to
two causes of actiona These courts reason that the defendant's wrongful
1. 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958).
2. See generally, Annot., 62 A.LR.2d 977 (1958).
3. Clancey v. McBride, 338 Ill. 35, 169 N.E. 729 (1929); Public Service Co. v.
Dalbey, 119 Ind. App. 405, 85 N.E.2d 368 (1949); Lennon v. Butle, 67 Mont.
101, 214 Pac. 1101 (1923); Smith v. Red-Top Taxicab Corp., 111 N.J.L 439, 168
AtL. 796 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933); Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N.Y.
40,62 N.E. 772 (1902); Winters v. Bisaillon, 153 Ore. 509, 57 P.2d 1095 (1936);
Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1, 52 S.E.2d 135 (1949); Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14
Q.B. D. 141 (1884).
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act is not in itself a cause of action, but, rather, that a cause of action
consists of the result of the defendant's wrongful act upon the plaintiff's
rights. They hold that simultaneous injury to. person and property is an
invasion of two distinct primary rights of the plaintiff, thus giving rise to
two separate causes of action. .
The majority of jurisdictions view the simultaneous injury to person
and property by a single act of the defendant as giving rise to but one
cause of action.4 These courts reason that a cause of action consists of
the defendant's wrongful, act rather. than the effect of that act upon the
plaintiff's primary rights. Further, they hold that the efficient adminis-
tration of justice requires that all claims the plaintiff may have against
the defendant arising from one transaction be adjudicated in one law
suit.
For thirteen years prior to Rush v. City of Maple Heights,5 many
attorneys relied upon the Ohio.Supreme Court's holding in Vasu v. Koh-
lers, Inc.6 as stating Ohio's adherence to the minority view. In the
Vasu case, the insurer of plaintiff's automobile indemnified plaintiff for
damage sustained to his automobile in a collision with defendant's auto-
mobile. The insurer was thus subrogated to plaintiff's right of recovery
against defendant for the amount paid to plaintiff. In a suit by the in-
surer against defendant, the latter prevailed. Plaintiff then sued for his
personal injuries. Defendant pleaded the prior judgment in his favor as
a bar to plaintiff's recovery in the instant suit. Defendant's argument
was that one indivisible cause of action arose in plaintiff's favor for injury
to person and property occasioned by the auto collison, and that to allow
two suits to be brought against the defendant, one by plaintiff and one by
4. E.g., Levitt v. Simco Sales Service, Inc., 50 Del. 557, 135 A.2d 910 (1957);
Travelers Indem. Co. v.-Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d'7 (1947); Hayward v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W.2d 316 (1942); Lloyds Ins.
Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 106 Miss. 244, 63 So. 455 (1913); Underwood v.
Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929); Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk
Co., 191 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620 (1956); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v.
Cleveland, 162 Tenn. 83, 34 S.W.2d 1059 (1931); Cormier v. Highway Trucking
Co., 312 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Moultroup v. Gorham, 113 Vt. 317,
34 A.2d 96 (1943); Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 Pac. 960 (1926);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeWees, 101 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1957).
5. 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958).
6. 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
7. 50 AM. JuR. Subrogation § 2 (1944) defines subrogation as "the substitution
of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right. It
is a device adopted by equity to compel the ultimate discharge of an obligation by
him who in good conscience ought to pay it. When subrogation does not result from
agreement between the parties, it may arise by operation of law where one person
has been compelled to pay a debt which ought to have been paid by another, thus
becoming entitled to exercise all the remedies which the creditor possessed against
that other."
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plaintiff's insurer, would allow plaintiff to split his cause of action. De-
fendant argued further that even if two suits could be brought against
him, the issue of negligence had been determined in his favor in the suit
by plaintiff's insurer, and because plaintiff was in privity with his insurer,
plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue, thus barring
a recovery by plaintiff in the second suit.
The court rejected both'of the defendant's arguments. The pertinent
holdings of the court quoted from the syllabus of -the case are set forth
below:
SYLLABUS 4
Injuries to both person and property'suffered by the same person as a
result of the same wrongful act are infringements of different rights and
give rise to distinct causes of action, with the result that the recovery or de-
nial of recovery of compensation for damages to the property is no bar to
an action subsequently prosecuted for the personal injury, unless by .an ad-
verse judgment in the first action issues are determined against the plaintiff
which operate as an estoppel against him in the second action.
SYLLABUS 6
Where an injury to person and to property through a single wrongful
act causes a prior contract of indemnity and subrogation as to the injury
to property, to come into operation for the benefit of the person injured,
the indemnitor may prosecute a separate action for reimbursement for in-
demnity monies paid under such contract.
SYLLABUS 7
Parties in privy, in the sense that they are bound by a judgment, are
those who acquired an interest in the subject matter after the beginning
of the action or the rendition of the judgment; and if their title or interest
attached before that fact, they are not bound unless made parties.8
The legal profession accepted syllabus 4 of the Vasu case as stating
the law in Ohio and acted accordingly. It became common practice for
many Ohio attorneys to file two actions, one for property damage and
one for personal injury, even when both actions were instituted by the
same plaintiff, It was as a result of this practice that the Ohio Supreme
Court was called upon to decide the case of Rash v. City of Maple
Heights.9
In the Rush case, the plaintiff recovered a municipal court judgment
against the defendant for property damage sustained due to the unsafe
condition of a public highway. Thereafter, plaintiff brought suit in com-
mon pleas court for personal injuries sustained from the same cause and
recovered judgment for $12,000.00. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court
reversed the judgment and ruled that:
Where one person suffers both personal injuries and property damage
as the result of the same wrongful act, only a single cause of action arises,
the different injuries occasioned thereby being separate items of damage
8. Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
9. 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958).
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from such act. (Paragraph four of the syllabus in the case of Vasu v.
Kohlers, Inc. ... overruled.) 10
The plaintiffs cause of action had, therefore, merged into the municipal
court judgment, and she was left with no right of recovery for the injury
to her person.
In its opinion of the Rush case, the Supreme Court intimated that the
holding in syllabus 4 of Varu v. Kohlers, I=. 11 was not necessary to the
determination of the issues therein, and, thus, that syllabus 4 was dictum.12
It should be noted, however, that on two occasions subsequent to its de-
cision of the Vasu case, the court had examined its holding in syllabus 4,
and on neither occasion did the court give any indication that syllabus 4
would not be followed.13 Further, a close reading of the opinion in the
Vasu case compels this writer to conclude that syllabus 4 was not dictum,
but, rather, that it was the real basis upon which the court based its de-
cision.14
To the degree that the plaintiff in the Rush case lost a $12,000 judg-
ment because she had filed separate suits in reliance upon the Supreme
Court's holding in syllabus 4 of Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc.,' 5 the Rush case
will always stand as a sad commentary on Ohio justice, and as a forceful
argument for prospective rather than retrospective court decisions.
10. Ibid.
11. 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
12. Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 235, 236, 147 N.E.2d 599,
607, 608 (1958).
13. In Markota v. East Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio St. 546, 97 N.E.2d 13 (1951),
the Supreme Court distinguished the Vasu case. In Mansker v. Dealers Transport
Co., 160 Ohio St. 255, 116 N.E.2d 3 (1953), the court held that the plaintiff was
barred from recovery for his personal injury loss because the issue of negligence had
been determined against him in a previous suit wherein he had asserted his claim for
property damage. The court could also have held the previous action for property
damage to be res judicata to the present action for personal injury and, thus, over-
rule syllabus 4 of the Vasu case without causing the plaintiff to forefeit an otherwise
valid judgment.
14. See Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 342, 61 N.E.2d 707, 718, where
the court held that an insurer who takes an assignment of an entire property loss
claim may recover the amount paid by him to the insured in a separate action, but
that where the insurer takes only a partial assignment of the property loss Claim, an
action by him to recover the amount paid would be res judicara to a subsequent ac-
tion by the insured to recover the unassigned portion of that claim. The court thereby
restricted the concept of a "separate right of action" to those situations wherein the
insured and his insurer would have been vested with separate causes of action by
reason of the distinction between personal injury and property damage. Thus, the
"separate right of action" concept developed by the court in the Vasu case appears
to be nothing more than a by-product of the two cause of action doctrine stated in
syllabus 4.
15. 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE ONE CAUSE OF ACTION DOCrRINE
If the Rush case decided nothing else, it did decide that where one
person suffers injury to both person and property as the result of one
wrongful act, he has but one cause of action and must, therefore, assert
both injuries in a single lawsuit if he is to have a full recovery. The
consequences of the one cause of action doctrine are, however, unsettled
in those instances where one who suffers injury to person and property
is insured against the property loss sustained, and where upon payment
of that loss, the insurer is subrogated'0 pro tanto to the injured party's
right of recovery against the tortfeasor.
Modification of the One Cause of Action Doctrine
If, as was held in Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc.,17 simultaneous injury to per-
son and property gave rise to two causes of action, the subrogation of an
insurer to the entire property damage claim of its insured would cause
no difficulty. In accordance with the Ohio code provision requiring that
all suits be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,'8 the in-
surer would be able to maintain an action for the property damage loss,
and the insured would be able to maintain a separate action for his per-
sonal injury loss. Now that injury to person and property has been held
to constitute but one cause of action, it is conceivable that only a single
action may be maintained in which the interests of both the insured and
his insurer must be asserted if there is to be a full recovery, and the ma-
jority of jurisdictions so hold.19
The majority of jurisdictions view the insured and the insurer of his
property damage loss as joint owners of a single cause of action who
may not split that cause of action by maintaining separate suits to recover
their respective losses. 20 Thus, the completion of an action by one joint
owner against the tortfeasor is held to be res judicata to a subsequent
action by the other joint owner. In order that there be a full recovery
against the tortfeasor, it is necessary that the insured and his insurer join
in one suit, or that the insured sue for the full amount of his damages,
holding as trustee for his insurer that portion of the judgment to which
16. See note 7 supra.
17. 145 Ohio St 321, 61 N.B.2d 707 (1945).
18. OMO REV..CODE § 2307.05.
19. E.g., Levitt v. Simco Sales Service, Inc., 50 Del. 557, 135 A.2d 910 (1957);
Hayward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W.2d 316 (1942);
Saber v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620 (1956);
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 162 Tenn. 83, 34 S.W.2d 1059 (1931);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeWees, 101 S.E.2d 273 (W.Va. 1957).
20. Ibid.
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the latter is entitled.2 1  The application of this rule has, in several in-
stances, deprived either the insured or his insurer of the right to recover
against the tortfeasor.22
In order to avoid this inequitable effect, a minority of jurisdictions
has circumvented the one cause of action doctrine in order to allow the
insured and his insurer to maintain separate actions. 23
A few jurisdictions, while maintaining that there is only a single cause
of action for injury to person and property, recognize two causes of ac-
tion where the property damage portion of the injured party's loss has
been assigned to his insurer pursuant to a subrogation agreement.24 These
jurisdictions contend that the partial assignment of a cause of action by
the insured divests him of his right to recover upon the part assigned and
creates in his insurer a new and different cause of action, thus allowing
each party to maintain a separate suit against the tortfeasor.
Ohio, however, has never viewed the partial assignment of a cause of
action as creating in the assignee a separate cause of action.25 The Ohio
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its position in Holibaugh v. Cox.20
In that case, the plaintiff instituted an action within the time allowed by
the statute of limitations against the defendant for the full amount of
damages suffered by her as the result of an automobile collision. Over
the defendant's objection, the court allowed the insurer of the plaintiff's
automobile to join as co-plaintiff in the action after the statute of limita-
tions had run. Certainly, had the court viewed a partial assignment as
creating in the assignee a separate cause of action, it would have refused
to allow the insurer in this case the right to assert his claim after the
statute of limitations had run. It must therefore be concluded that Ohio
21. E.g., Hayward v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W.2d
316 (1942).
22. See, e.g., Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 Pac. 960 (1926); Annot.,
47 A.L.R. 536, 537 (1927).
23. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947); Farmer
v. Union Ins. Co., 146 Miss. 600, 111 So. 584 (1927); Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg
Traction Co., 106 Miss. 244, 63 So. 455 (1913); General Exchange Ins. Corp. v.
Young, 357 Mo. 1099, 212 S.W.2d 396 (1948); Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C.
100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929); Le Blond Schacht Truck Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 478, 171 N.E. 414 (1929).
24. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co., 106 Miss. 244, 63 So. 455 (1913);
General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Young, 357 Mo. 1099, 212 S.W.2d 396 (1948);
Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929).
25. Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. First Cong. Church, 126 Ohio St. 140,
184 N.E. 512 (1933); Lake Erie & W.R.R. Co. v. Falk, 62 Ohio St. 297, 56 N.E.
1020 (1900); Verdier v. Marshailville Equity Co., 70 Ohio App. 434, 46 N.E.2d
636 (1940); Norwich Union Fire Ins. Sec'y, v. Stang, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 464, 9 Ohio
C.C. Dec. 576 (1897).
26. 167 Ohio St. 340. 148 N.E.2d 677 (1958).
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views the partial assignor and his assignee as joint owners of one cause
of action.
It need not be concluded, however, that because Ohio does not recog-
nize separate causes of action in the insured and his insurer, that they
may not maintain separate suits. A few jurisdictions which adhere to
the one cause of action doctrine have engrafted an exception onto the
doctrine to allow the parties to sue separately.27 Although these juris-
dictions do not purport to create a separate cause of action in the insurer,
they recognize instead a separate "right of recovery" in each of the
parties. Under this theory, the outer limits of the parties' separate "rights
of recovery" should not need to conform to the distinction between per-
sonal injury and property damage that is part and parcel of the doctrine
which holds that there are two causes of action for injury to person and
property. Thus, where the insurer is only partially subrogated to the
property damage loss sustained by the insured, the insurer should be able
to sue for the amount of the property damage loss to which he has been
subrogated, and the insured should retain the right to recover for the
personal injuries he has sustained and for the unsubrogated portion of
his property damage loss. For example, if A suffers $5,000 injury to
his person and $2,000 damage to his automobile in a collision with an
automobile operated by X, and B indemnifies A for $1,900 pursuant to
a $100 deductible automobile collision insurance contract, B may recover
the $1,900 paid to A, and A should retain the right -to recover $5,100, repre-
senting his entire personal injury loss and the unindemnified portion of
his property damage loss.
This may be the theory that Ohio adopts, or, perhaps, has already
adopted. As was noted earlier,28 the court's decision in Vasu v. Kohlers,
1c.29 allowing separate suits to be prosecuted by the insured and the
insurer was based upon two grounds. The first ground, stated in syllabus
4 of the Vasu case, that injury to person and property constitutes two
causes of action, was overruled by Rush v. City of Maple Heights.s° The
second ground, stated in syllabus 6, that the indemnitor of the injured
party may prosecute a separate action against the tortfeasor, has not been
overruled and probably remains as the law in Ohio today. The Supreme
Court in its decision of the Rush case appears to have approved a modifi-
cation of the one cause of action doctrine when it stated:
27. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947); Farmer
v. Union Ins. Co., 146 Miss. 600, 111 So. 584 (1927); Le Blond Schacht Truck Co.
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 34 Ohio App. 478, 171 N.E. 414 (1929).
28. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
29. 145 Ohio St 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
30. 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958).
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Upon further examination of the cases from other jurisdictions, it ap-
pears that in those instances where the courts have held to the majority
rule, a separation of causes of action is almost universally recognized where
an insurer has acquired by an assignment or by subrogation the right to re-
cover for money it has advanced to pay for property damage.3 '
Further, in holding syllabus 4 of the Vasu case to be dictum,3 2 the court
in the Rush case must have intended that syllabus 6 of the Vasu case was
determinative of the issues therein, thus giving tacit approval to the
separate right of recovery concept.
Although this concept substantially eliminates the inequity resulting
from the one cause of action doctrine, it does create problems with re-
spect to joinder of parties.
JOINDER OF PARTIES
Section 2307.20 of the Ohio Revised Code states in part:
Parties who are united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or de-
fendants. If the consent of one who should be joined as plaintiff cannot
be obtained .... and that fact is stated in the petition, he may be made
a defendant.
If, as was held in the Vasu case, simultaneous injury to person and
property gave rise to two separate causes of action, Ohio's mandatory
joinder statute would not be applicable where subrogation had operated
to invest the injured party's insurer with the right to recover the entire
property damage loss sustained by his insured. The insured would retain
his cause of action for personal injury, and the insurer would have the
right to prosecute a distinct and separate cause of action for property
damage. Thus, because each would be the owner of a separate cause of
action, they could not be held to be parties united in interest under the
Ohio mandatory joinder statute. Where, however, two parties are the
joint owners of a single cause of action, they are united in interest and
the defendant may require that the party not represented in the action be
joined, or in default thereof, that the action be dismissed for a defect in
parties plaintiff.33
If Ohio should adhere to the one cause of action doctrine as modified
by allowing the insured and his insurer a separate right of recovery, it
seems that the mandatory joinder statute should be applicable. Despite
31. Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 233, 147 N.E.2d 599, 606
(1958).
32. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
33. Holibaugh v. Cox, 167 Ohio St. 340, 148 N.E.2d 677 (1958); Cleveland
Paint & Color Co. v. Bauer Mfg. Co., 155 Ohio St. 17, 97 N.E.2d 545 (1951);
Nat'l Retailers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gross, 142 Ohio St. 132, 50 N.E.2d 258 (1943);
Verdier v. Marshallville Equity Co., 70 Ohio App. 434, 46 N.E.2d 636 (1940).
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the fact that they may institute separate suits against the tortfeasor, the
insured and his insurer are still joint owners of but one indivisible cause
of action, and are parties united in interest.
It should be noted that the mandatory joinder statute does not oper-
ate so as to make the joint owners of one cause of action "indispensable
parties." The defendant may require that a party not represented be
joined in the action or, in default thereof, that the action be dismissed,
but if the defendant should fail to call the court's attention to the defect
in parties prior to final judgment; the defendant will have waived his
right to have the parties joined, and the judgment rendered will be valid
and binding3 4 Thus, it has been held that the partial assignor of a tort
claim may recover the full amount of his loss in the absence of a motion
by the defendant to have the partial assignee made a party to the action.35
It is dear in Ohio that in an action by the insurer for that portion
of a tort claim to which he is subrogated, the defendant may require the
insured to be joined in the action3 8 Although authority for the proposi-
tion is scarce, it seems logical that in an action by the insured to recover
only the unsubrogated portion of a tort claim, the defendant could require
that the insurer be joined as a party to the action.31 Thus, the defendant
is able to compel the insured and his insurer to assert in one action every
claim they may have against him arising from his wrongful act.
Where the defendant has failed to move for joinder, and thus has
allowed either the insured or the insurer to maintain a separate action,
it is doubtful that the defendant could require a joinder of parties in a
subsequent action prosecuted by one who was not made a party to the
earlier suit.3 8 The purpose of the mandatory joinder statute is to protect
the defendant from litigating a multiplicity of actions, and to speed the
administration of justice by removing from the courts those matters
which have already been adjudicated. Thus, it would serve no purpose
34. Holibaugh v. Cox, 167 Ohio St. 340, 148 N.E.2d 677 (1958).
35. Ibid.
36. Holibaugh v. Cox, 167 Ohio St. 340, 148 N.E.2d 677 (1958); Nat'l Retailers
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gross, 142 Ohio St. 132, 50 N.E.2d 258 (1943).
37. See Barnhillv. Brown, 58 Ohio App. 188, 16 N.E.2d 478 (1937), where the
court held that the partial insurer of an injured party's loss is a "proper" party to an
action by the injured party, but not a "necessary" party thereto. The court further
stated that the insurer "could be brought into the case by the action of either the
plaintiff or defendant so as to have a complete determination of the rights of all
parties who might have an interest in the result of the litigation." It appears to this
writer that one who can be joined as a party to an action by either the plaintiff or
the defendant may correctly be termed a "necessary" party thereto rather than merely
a "proper" party. Compare Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1242, 1254 (1945), with 30 0.
JUR.2d Insurance § 898 (1958).
38. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947); Spargur
v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 152 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
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in allowing the defendant to join a party whose rights against him had
already been adjudicated in a prior action.
ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT
As has already been noted, one of the arguments asserted by the de-
fendant in Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc.39 was that the issue of negligence had
been decided in his favor in a prior action brought against him by the
plaintiff's insurer, and, because plaintiff was in privity with his insurer,
plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue. The Ohio
Supreme Court rejected this argument. The court held that the insured
was not in privity with his insurer, and thus the determination in an
action by the insurer that the defendant was not negligent was not bind-
ing upon the insured and could be relitigated by him in a subsequent
action. The court laid down two principles in support of this holding:
SYLLABUS 7
Parties in privy, in the sense that they are bound by the judgment, are
those who acquired an interest in the subject matter after the beginning
of the action or the rendition of the judgment; and if their tide or interest
attached before that fact, they are not bound unless made parties.4 0
SYLLABUS 8
A grantor or assignor is not bound, as to third persons, by any judg-
ment which such third persons may obtain against his grantee or assignee
adjudicating the tide to or claim for the interest transferred, unless he
participated in the action in such manner as to become, in effect, a party.4 1
Thus, the court held that the insured was not in privity with his insurer
because the succession of the insurer to the rights of the insured occurred
before the institution of the action to adjudicate those rights.4 2 Further,
the court held that the insured could not be in privity with his insurer
because the insured did not succeed to the rights of his insurer, but rather
it was the insurer who succeeded to his insured's rights, and the successor
cannot bind his predecessor in interest.43
A recent common pleas court decision, Spargur v. Dayton Power and
Light Co.,44 has taken issue with the Supreme Court on the question of
what parties are in privity. The common pleas court held that syllabus 7,
stating that only those who acquire an interest after the beginning of an
action are in privity, was dictum in the Vasu case and need not be fol-
39. 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
40. Id. at 345, 61 N.E.2d at 719.
41. Id. at 346, 61 N.E.2d 719.
42. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 89 (1942).
43. See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 442 (5th ed. 1925).
44. 152 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
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lowed. Briefly stated, the court's reasoning is that the insured could not
have been in privity with his insurer because the insurer was the successor
in interest and so could not bind the insured.45
The common pleas court held that the issue of negligence, decided
in favor of the defendant in a suit brought by the insured, was binding
on the insurer in a subsequent suit brought by him and would bar
a recovery by him. Thus, this court refused to restrict the effect of es-
toppel by judgment to those situations where the successors interest is
acquired by him after the commencement of an action. The legal basis
of the court's holding seems to rest upon the theory that because the in-
sured is able to maintain an action to recover the fall amount of his dam-
ages, thereby representing his insurer as well as himself, he has the power
to bind his insurer as to matters decided in a suit prosecuted by the
insured to recover only the unsubrogated portion of his loss.46 The true
rationale of this decision, though, seems to rest upon considerations of
public policy. The public policy concepts involved are stated by the court
as follows:
It is logical and well within public policy that an adverse finding on
either the issue of negligence or contributory negligence in the principle
action should estop the insurer in the separate action. This will avoid
contrary decisions within an 'indivisible' cause of action and prevent a
return to the litigious chaos that the former rule promoted 47
Admitting that there is some authority to the contrary,48 this writer
is compelled to accept the Supreme Court's theory that only those who
acquire an interest in the subject matter after the commencement of the
action are parties in privity. The reasoning employed by the common
pleas court is not entirely convincing. Although the insured is able to
maintain an action to recover the full amount of his loss, and in so doing
represents his insurer as well as himself,49 when the insured chooses to
sue for only the unsubrogated portion of his loss, there is no legal prin-
ciple that compels one to conclude that the insurer is bound as to matters
adjudicated in a prior suit to which the insurer was not a party and was
not represented. 50 The relationship of the insurer to the insured is most
similar to that of corenancy. The insured and his insurer are joint own-
ers of one cause of action, and like cotenants, they are not in privity.5 1
45. Id. at 925.
46. Id. at 926.
47. Id. at 927.
48. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947).
49. See notes 21 and 35 supra and accompanying text.
50. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTs § 438 (5th ed. 1925).
51. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 103 (1942); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTs § 485
(5th ed. 1925).
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Granted that the relationships differ in that each cotenant has a separate
cause of action for injury to the property in which he has a partial in-
terest, whereas the insured and his insurer share but one cause of action,
still the similarities are greater than the dissimilarities. This is particu-
larly true where the joint owners of one cause of action have separate
Tights of recovery. The following excerpt from the Restatement of the
Law of Judgments states well the theory herein advanced:
Joint tenants and tenants in common normally should be co-plaintiffs
in maintaining an action with reference to the common property, but if the
defendant does not object to the non-joinder, his failure to do so does not
prevent, by merger or by bar, the other co-owners from bringing an ac-
tion, nor is any matter decided in the case determinative in a subsequent
action brought by the other co-owners. 52
There are public policy arguments present on either side of this issue.
To this writer, one of those arguments stands out above all the others.
If the separate right of recovery of the insured and his insurer is to be
preserved, it is necessary that neither of them be deprived of his day in
court. The Ohio mandatory joinder statute 53 provides adequate protec-
tion against harassment to the defendant who will but avail himself of
its use.5
4
CONCLUSION
Based upon established Ohio law, it is most likely that the Ohio man-
datory joinder statute will be interpreted as requiring the joinder of the
insured and his insurer on motion of the defendant in any action prose-
cuted separately by one or the other of them. Where the defendant fails
to move for joinder, an exception will probably be made to the one cause
of action doctrine which will allow the party not joined to bring a sepa-
rate suit. The insured and his insurer will probably not be held to be
parties in privity, and, thus, a determination of law or fact in a suit prose-
cuted separately by one of them will not be binding upon the other unless
he has participated or has been represented in the prior suit.
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52. RESTATEumNT, JUDGMENTS § 103 (1942).
53. OHIO REv. CODE § 2307.20 (1953).
54. An insurer who prefers not to gamble on how the Supreme Court will decide
the issue of privity has the right to intervene in a suit instituted by the insured. Lake
Erie & W.R.R. Co. v. Falk, 62 Ohio St. 297, 56 N.E. 1020 (1900).
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